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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the 
Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars 
of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of 
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background 
studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 
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East-West Relations in Change -  Some Implications 
of the Western Aid Regime for the Political Economy 




For more than four decades East-West relations were described in terms of 
antagonism and ideological confrontation. This came to an end in early 
1989, when the leaders of the Trade Union Solidarity and Polish United 
Workers’ Party negotiated the conditions for the ending of communism at 
the Round Table in Warsaw. Since then, all Eastern-Central European 
countries (ECE)1 * have embarked, one after the other, on radical 
transformation programmes from centrally planned to market economies and 
from a communist to a democratic polity. These policies have been actively 
encouraged, supported, and even demanded by the highly developed 
industrial countries in the West and in particular by their international 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
as well as by the European Community (EC) in its position as the 
coordinating body of the G-24 Aid Programme and its own PHARE
This paper benefitted from criticisms and remarks from Gunther Bachmann, Stefano 
Guzzini, Susan Strange and Alexander Surdej. The help of the EUI’s language correction 
service was crucial. The research was completed in December 1992. Further comments 
are welcome and should be sent to the following address: Bemd Baumgartl/Andreas 
Stadler, European University Institute, CPN 2330, 1-50100 Firenze. Fax: (39)(55) 4685 
330; e-mail: Baumgart@bf.iue.it.
1 We are in particular talking about Poland and Bulgaria; some observations will also
be made regarding CSFR, Hungary, Romania, and the states in the former Yugoslav



























































































Programme.2 As a consequence, East-West relations have undergone a 
profound transformation.
“Where is the East going?” asked a speaker at a symposium of East 
European intellectuals organised by the French press. He immediately 
answered the question himself: “The East wants to go towards the West, 
but finds itself in the South” .3 Indeed, certain new aspects of East-West 
relations remind us of the old features of North-South relations: aid 
dependence and the power of the North to shape internal changes in the 
dependent countries.
On the other hand, with a new quality of East-West relations, with 
growing cooperation between the two societies and with common efforts. 
Eastern and Western Europe might draw closer to each other in the 1990s, 
and form one common economic, cultural and maybe also political entity 
at some point after the year 2000.
In order to shed some light on the current state of East-West relations, 
this paper will analyse some of its specific structures and actors, and in 
addition will investigate the policy processes involved in the economic, 
political and ecological reconstruction of Poland and Bulgaria. The aim is 
to relate Western policies (chapter III) to Eastern changes (chapter IV). The 
guiding questions focus on the effects and the quality of Western support. 
We use three approaches in our analysis. First, we present an ‘ecological 
view’4 of the recent developments between Eastern and Western Europe 
(chapter II). Second, by making the basis of integration theories explicit, we 
try to assess if East-West relations can indeed be described in terms of 
integration. Third, we take a critical view and analyse the basis of a 
modernised dependence approach and its relevance. After this theory-guided 
process-analysis we try to come up with proposals for process-improvement 
(chapter V).
2 The acronym stems from the French title of the first EC programme for Eastern 
Europe: “ Pologne et Hongrie: Assistance pour la Reconstruction Economique” ; by now 
all Eastern European countries benefit from this arrangement.
3 “ L’Est guarda ai paesi ricchi ma fa i conti col sottosviluppo” , La Repubblica, 23 
April 1992.
4 The terms ecological and environmental will be used interchangeably, following the 
Gentian practice of using both expressions (okologisch, Umwelt-); Slavonic languages 
prefer ekologicesko, but in official documents, names, etc. also okolna sreda, 
okruzajuscaja sreda is found. However, in English, German. French and Italian the word 
used in the context of policy and political analysis is: environmental, Umwelt-, 
environnemental, ambientale. Ecological refers more directly to nature and biology. See 






























































































Environmental problems had and still have a significant role in the East 
European transition. The first protest groups in Hungary, GDR, Slovakia. 
Slovenia and especially in Bulgaria mobilised around the environmental 
issue.5 Moreover, the establishment of a new economic system, and the 
shift to new property relations during the privatisation process are highly 
dependent on ecological conditions. Liability for existing environmental 
damage and the costs of environmental clean-up influence the cost-benefit 
considerations of potential (both foreign and domestic) investors. Social and 
political implications consist of a declining quality of life and an insistence 
of the population to see some quick positive results from the new system.
Although Western countries have included environmental parameters 
earlier in their legislative framework, the main reason for the failure of 
environmental protection in the West and the East was in fact the lack of 
implementation. In the East, the contradictory tasks of maximising 
production in order to comply with central planning on the one hand and 
of reaching ecological goals on the other hand made even existing 
regulation a second rate concern.
Determinants for East-West Relations?
The transnational character of environmental problems is not only evident 
when transboundary pollution is at stake. The relations with Western 
countries and the introduction of a Western-type production system 
introduce a new set of dangers for a sound environment. Economic 
decisions especially, whether intentionally or not, have serious 
environmental consequences.
The principles of capitalist and free market conditions are being 
introduced in Eastern Europe without the mediating influence of adequately 
developed state regulation and without effective pressure from the 
population through non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
It is precisely state regulation which is the most decisive factor for 
environmental awareness in the West -  and it is likely to increase (Smith, 
1992, p. 8). As far as the environment is concerned, there is a strong 
contradiction between neo-liberal laissez-faire in the East and growing state 
intervention in the West. The Fifth Action Programme of the European




























































































Community, for example, calls for the integration of environmental 
considerations in all other policy areas (CEC, 1992). Reduction of the 
state’s role is a conceivable reaction in states which see their environmental 
problems as mainly due to a centrally planned economic system -  but it is 
also promoted by Western assistance. In the case of radical reform 
programmes, the danger exists of throwing the baby out with the bath 
water, particularly when governmental measures are badly needed. In fact 
there is a stark contrast between the position of environmental issues on the 
international agenda (where they are high and ascending) and on the 
national agendas of the ECE countries (where they are low and descending).
Environmental cooperation, nevertheless,per se does not explicitly favour 
liberalism nor dependence (see paragraphs 2 and 3). In theory it could be 
based on either of the two types of relation. Future ecological conditions 
can be seen as a consequence of the integration into the Western economic 
framework or they are determined by Eastern dependence on foreign 
decisions. The integration of East and West European environmental policy 
is thus contrary to environmental dependence. The latter is forced onto 
Eastern Europe, and implies a dominance of Western needs and brings the 
danger of growing environmental negligence; the former is developed 
jointly, bearing in mind needs and abilities of both sides. Both have their 
advantages and disadvantages.
Economic Implications
We can identify three reasons why even economic development may have 
negative environmental results (Yearly, 1991, p. 162);
1. Externalities of pollution and its subsequent social costs, which include 
a decreasing life-expectancy, increasing infrastructural and health 
expenditures and cleanup spending, limit the potential net benefit.
2. Profits in one specific area might be outweighed through losses which 
are caused by environmental deterioration in other sectors. This is the case 
if the latter rely mainly on a clean environment and applies especially to 
sustainable activities in tourism or agriculture.
3. Usually healthy, expanding and future-oriented companies are able to 
fund pollution control out of rising profits. Firms which are forced to shift 
their production to cheaper locations with lower ecological costs, on the 
other hand, are likely to have less environmental awareness.
Although environmental problems in Western Europe are far from being 
solved, some levels of emissions have stabilised, which suggests that the 
effect of economic growth can partly be offset by technological progress in 




























































































opposite is likely to happen: on the one hand, after the present decrease a 
sharp rise of economic growth rates can be expected; on the other hand it 
is by no means clear that environmental technology will be available to a 
similar degree. Lack of knowledge, skills and financing are likely to slow 
down the introduction of effective environmental protection.
In simulations of policy options for the Internal Market a task force 
group of the EC found that
government financing of environmental investments had little or no influence on 
economic indicators. Moreover, increased environmental protection will give an 
impetus to growth in the environmental protection industry. So there is no evidence 
that expenditures at this level for the implementation of environmental policies would 
reduce the benefits of [expected economic growth in] the Internal Market. (CEC. 
1991, 12.9.)
These results suggest that traditional arguments about the feasibility of 
environmental protection -  ECE cannot afford the luxury of environmental 
expenditures -  have to be reviewed carefully.
A further caveat concerns the potential negative impact of free trade on 
the environment. If national environmental measures are seen as ‘trade 
distorting’, successful economic integration in the international framework 
-  and the ensuing lack of national environmental measures -  would involve 
increasingly negative environmental impact.
Social Constraints
Any consideration of environmental cleanup and reconstruction in Eastern 
Europe must bear in mind that such matters are unlikely to be high on the 
list of priorities. There are other social problems which require immediate 
solutions, and sometimes environmental demands could even worsen the 
existing difficulties. Especially when the closure of highly polluting (heavy) 
industry is at stake, the affected population sees a contradiction in 
ecological measures: unemployment for them is a far more direct and 
perceivable danger (Nissen, 1992). Thus close cooperation between East 
and West is put forward as the only way of coping with environmental 
problems, which affect Europe as a whole.
Bachmann, in his study on the environmental reconstruction after German 
reunification, clearly demonstrates how an exogenous (in this case by the 
Federal Republic) approach neglects the existence of previously existing 
expertise. The inefficient ecological policy in the East does not mean that 
Eastern experts did not know how to solve the problems. It tells us more 
about the difficulties these experts had in implementing their knowledge 
(Bachmann, 1993). The exclusion of this home-grown expertise is one of 




























































































However, environmental policy imposed from outside might also be 
considered the only way of ensuring that environmental problems are really 
faced up to in the East. Both environmental cleanup and protection are 
long-term goals; Eastern governments are presently concerned with more 
immediate challenges. Their failure in crucial areas (inflation control, 
unemployment) might deprive them of the necessary support of the 
population. In the programme of urgent reform tasks the environment is 
likely to be left behind.
Is Nature a Power?
If East-West relations are really affected by the impact of environmental 
constraints, all actors involved will have to act in a way they would not 
otherwise act. For the moment this is not the case: other interests and 
impacts have a stronger role. Nevertheless, in some regions the ecological 
catastrophe could turn into the key factor for all development questions. In 
that case most of the funds available would be used for environmental 
cleanup, as for example in the Salesian Triangle; theoretically, some regions 
might even be abandoned, and the population moved to other areas, because 
of too high ‘external costs’ (i.e. costs which are not directly linked to 
current production activities, but exist because of past pollution). In such 
a situation nature would be a really powerful factor, exercising the same 
influence on East-West relations as political, economic or military power. 
Indeed, the longer environmental factors continue to be ignored, the 
stronger nature’s power will become (see Model 1).
J | ~ E a s t / W e s t - R e l a t i o n s  a s  a  C o n s e q u e n c e  o f  e c o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s
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Nature could then be considered a key factor in international relations. 
Slowly these considerations are beginning to be referred to in studies of 
international affairs. As one example, Strange, in her “ realistic model” of 
a new global order, considers the three most important tasks and challenges 
for a joint political authority in the world community to be: the provision 
of security, the stability of money and exchange markets, and -  “ last not 
least, the protection of a sustainable ecology” (1992, pp. 7-8). Similarly, 
the EC Task Force for the impact of the Internal Market on the 
Environment stated the following:
The European Community has now a unique chance to assist the Eastern European 
countries to properly manage and protect their environment, thus contributing to the 
reduction of pollution [also] in the Community. (CEC, 1991, 12.10.)
This statement is applicable also to the other Western partners of Eastern 
Europe. If Finland were to use a strict cost-benefit analysis for its 
environmental expenditure, the whole national budget for the environment 
would be spent outside Finland -  in the ex-USSR and the Baltic states.
The most striking example of Western responsibility for the East is 
unified Germany, where former Western Germany now faces the problem, 
in the new Bundeslander, of cleaning up its own waste, which had been 
cheaply exported in former times to the GDR. This could be a metaphor for 
a unifying Europe, too: environmental protection as a symbol of European 
cooperation -  for mutual benefit.
The concepts of short-term profit maximisation and quick economic up­
turn (associated with and expected to come about solely through the 
introduction of the market economy) on the one hand and the real needs 
and actual resources of the whole community far into future on the other 
are in open contradiction. Since environmental deterioration causes 
irreversible effects, which might mean huge -  and at present unpredictable 
-  costs in the future, the importance of the time factor is only too clear.
All evaluations of environmental damage and cleanup costs are based on 
national statistics and estimations. In a report to the NATO Economics 
Directorate, Feshbach underlines (1991, p. 4) that available figures for the 
Soviet Union are at least 30%, and quite probably 50-100%, underesti­
mated. The same is likely to be true for the rest of Eastern Europe, both for 
pollution levels and for estimated costs.
The longer environmental cleanup and reconstruction are put off, the 
more expensive they are likely to be. Long-term economic calculations 
suggest that these problems should be tackled immediately.
If environmental matters are linked to the operationalisation of aid 




























































































of ‘environmental imperialism’. This means their inclusion as a part of 
economic reconstruction is forced onto ECE. The effect of such an 
impression might be to weaken the success of reconstruction programmes 
themselves.
Environmental relations6 between East and West can be seen as a 
specific example of how ecological conditions influence international 
relations. We can thus conclude that nature really has become a ‘power’.
2. A Liberal View of Integration
The explicit aim of Western policies towards the East and of Eastern 
policies towards the West has been integration of the East into the world 
market, as well into certain Western transnational political structures. 
Accordingly, the political slogan “Back to Europe” mobilised many 
Eastern voters in the first free elections. Generally -  although opinions vary 
strongly -  integration is perceived to bring about common security for both, 
and political stability (democracy) and economic development (market 
economy) for the East.7
This is something entirely new, since East-West relations were 
charcterised by mutual exclusion until the fall of communism. Beginning 
with the Marshall Plan in 1948, which encouraged the start of economic 
and political integration of Western Europe as a way of establishing a 
bulwark against the Stalinist threat, the West pursued a clear policy of self­
integration and built up the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the European Community (EC) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Policies vis-à-vis the East were 
characterised by exclusion of the latter, epitomised by the setting of the 
COCOM.8 Only the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), founded in 1975 in Helsinki, relaxed this exclusive strategy and 
made borders more permeable. The East followed this pattern closely and
6 Jessica Tuchman Mathews in Foreign Affairs (1990), and also as editor (1991) of 
Preserving the Global Environment, and Peter Haas in several publications have initiated 
the theoretical tackling of international environmental relations on a global level. 
However, the interference of environmental constraints in the economic sphere has 
mostly been discussed on a micro-economic level.
7 See the “ Europe Agreement” , December 1991 and the “ Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe” , Europe Documents, no. 1672, 14.12.1990.
8 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, founded in 1949 by the West 




























































































set up the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA); it not only closed its markets, but controlled most political, 
cultural and social contacts in an attempt to avoid ‘reactionary 
embourgeoisement’.
The new feature of East-West relations is that Eastern Europe, having 
developed specific and profoundly different economic, political and social 
structures in four decades of exclusion, is now being integrated in existing 
structures and organisations, which were established by the West either 
without participation of or in direct opposition to the East. Examples of 
structures created without the participation of the East are the world trade 
system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the EC, the 
financial system as exemplified in the WB and the IMF; an example of 
structures which were designed in direct opposition to the East is NATO. 
Parallelly, Eastern countries have abandoned all ‘Eastern’ integrative 
structures (CMEA, Warsaw Pact, Bilateral Agreements).
But on which of these aspects does integration theory focus? Integration 
theory started with the functionalist assumption that collaboration in one 
sector generates a real need for collaboration in another sector (Mitrany, 
1975). Increasing transactions between countries, such as trade, capital 
movements and communications, as well as the exchange of ideas and 
people will socialise transnational elites which will create an integrationist 
identity and politicise common structures. Integration is described as a 
process,
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift 
their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states (Haas 
1958, p. 16).
It means therefore also a reduction of sovereignty in favour of trans- and 
supra-national structures and organisations. The success of integration 
depends on conditions, such as the perceived equity of distribution of 
benefits, or at least it presupposes that, even if some may benefit more, all 
grow and benefit to some extent, i.e. nobody loses in absolute terms. It is 
also of importance that alternatives to integration are less satisfactory.
According to integration theory, European East-West relations may be 
said to have an integrative character, if the following (necessary but not 
sufficient!) trends could be empirically proven:9
9 This list draws mainly on Deutsch (1957) and Nye (1971). Note that nothing is 




























































































1. There is a growing symmetry and similarity of economies. Most theorists 
are very sceptical about the possibility of integration between poor and rich 
nations (Deutsch, 1972). West European economic assistance accelerates 
this process which is mainly caused by introduction of market economies 
in ECE and by their integration into the world economy. This assumption 
is based on the liberal, as opposed to the nationalist and marxist paradigm 
of international economic relations (Gilpin, 1987, pp. 26-41), which 
assumes that all countries gain from increased exchange, i.e. that the 
opening of Eastern Europe to the world economy enhances its development 
and modernisation.
2. A compact network of communication (Deutsch, 1972) emerges, i.e. 
common political structures are gradually established, where conflict can be 
settled in a transparent and fair way. In East-West terms, this means that 
new common political structures are developed in order to settle conflicts, 
to formulate common policies and to steer the process of integration.
3. Values become complementary and similar. In East-West terms, this 
means that all involved states agree on general values like human rights, 
democracy and market economy. In particular there are common visions 
about the methods used for the modernisation and integration of Eastern 
Europe. Conflict exists only regarding technical, but not regarding principal 
questions.
4. Environmental integration into Western structures is speeded up. The 
communist regime has brought Eastern Europe to the edge of a catastrophe 
(Foerster 1991). Gradual evolution away from such a system would take a 
considerable amount of time. A radical integration into Pan-European 
environmental structures quickly improves the environmental situation in 
ECE.
Other theories, which are useful for the analysis of ‘postcommunist’ East- 
West relations, can be found in the literature on interdependence. 
Interdependence is usually defined as an institutionalised relationship based 
on mutual symmetrical dependence of two (or several) equal states as a 
result of international and transnational processes of interaction, such as 
trade, communication, international organisations (Kaiser, 1969). ‘Domestic 
politics’ and ‘foreign politics’ are more and more closely interlinked; 
limited natural resources demand more and more cooperation between 
states; the increasing complexity and entanglement of international relations 
demand more and more institutional arrangements and structures in order 
to manage a growing global interdependence (Behrens and Noak, 1984; 


































































































5. Military security is no longer the priority of individual states; rather its 
place has been taken by problems of industrial and technological 
development, supply of energy and limited resources, economic and 
ecological vulnerability and collective security. Growing interdependence 
is also the consequence of transboundary environmental problems.
6. Transnational actors, be they governmental or private, act more and more 
in the furtherance of their own aims, the regulating role of sovereign states 
becomes limited.
The integration-interdependence approach can be simplified in a figure 
where governments (East and West), international organisations, and 
societies (economies) influence each other, without being related by clear- 
cut structures of domination (see Model 2).
B ^ t Eg Ra t ,q N M o d e l  o f  Ea s t - W e s t  R e l a t i o n s
W est East
GOVER
S o c i e t y - ------------------------------ -- S o c i e t y
n m ENTS —----------------------------- — G o v e r n m e n t s
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
Western governments influence and support Eastern governments in 
transition, Eastern governments cooperate with Western governments for 
mutual benefits; they try to influence the public opinion of Western 
societies in order to obtain more support and Western and Eastern 
governments cooperate with international organisations (especially IMF and 
EBRD) in order to realise the above mentioned political aims of integration. 




























































































3. A Critical View of Dependence
After two years of reform in Eastern Europe, disillusion has replaced the 
euphoria of the first revolutionary days. Despite the strong desire of the 
new political elites to become a ‘part of Europe’, they feel excluded. The 
CSCE provides just a loose, non-binding framework of collective security 
and NATO is, despite the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) together with the ECE, still a Western security 
organisation. The European Community avoided any commitment to 
eventual membership and to political cooperation in the recently accorded 
Europe Agreements with the ECE countries. The most important trade 
sectors (coal, steel and agriculture) still remain to some extent protected and 
the debt question is still unresolved. ECE citizens feel ‘second class’ and 
excluded in terms of job migration. Support for Eastern Europe is mainly 
debt-increasing and highly conditional on orthodox neo-liberal reform- 
programmes from which the majority of social groups do not benefit, with 
the exception of a small rising entrepreneurial class. President Walesa has 
voiced the following accusation:
Europe is divided economically. We, citizens of the poorer Europe, have the 
impression that the richer Europe is closing its doors in front of us. A time without 
friends is ahead of us.10 1
Anatolij Sobchak, Mayor of Saint Petersburg, and a leading democratic 
politician has said:
If the IMF demands that the Russian government carry out a reform which will lead 
to millions of starving citizens, then I say that this demand is not only immoral, but 
also futile and dangerous. It prepares the way for a new totalitarian power, more 
aggressive than the last one."
These political statements depict a gloomy picture which will be illuminated 
with some aspects of dependence theories. Analysis focuses on the politics 
and interests that are actually pursued by states. States are much more 
concerned with their own security and believe less in collective, 
integrationist, and interdependent solutions; they are more interested in 
expanding their national political influence and their economic power. The 
role of international organisations is not dominant and they have no
10 Speech at the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 4.11.1991.

































































































autonomy, they represent the lowest common denominator of interests.12 *
International organisations play a role only to the extent that they serve the 
interests of a limited number of powerful states.
The Eastern European countries, which face severe political, economic, 
and ecological crises, are in a weak position in bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations. As receivers of aid and support, they have little power to 
influence international structures to promote their interests (see Model 3).
^  D e p e n d e n c e  M o d e l  o f  e a s t -w e s t  r e l a t i o n s
W est East
G o v e r n m e n t s G o v e r n m e n t s
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
SOCI ETY S o c i  e t y
Given that weaker states are dependent on stronger states, and on their 
international organisations, the latter have also some power to change the 
internal structures of the former. Dependence means therefore asymmetrical 
interdependence (in contrast to symmetrical interdependence). -  a state of 
relations where the stronger state is able to exercise power over the weaker 
state. The weaker state is a policy-taker, strongly influenced in its develop­
ment by external forces (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Gilpin, 1987, p. 33).
This dependence approach is decisively different from the original Latin- 
American dependencia theories. The latter try to explain in historical.
12 This approach is referred to as realism. See Behrens and Noak (1984. p. 153) and 




























































































economic and socio-political terms why underdevelopment is continuously 
reproduced by the cores (i.e. the developed North) in the peripheries (i.e. 
in the developing countries of the South). Partly based on a marxist concept 
of the value of labour, they claim that the surplus, produced in the 
peripheries, is not used in order to develop national economies. On the 
contrary, it is appropriated by core and periphery elites who find themselves 
in a strategic coalition dedicated to maintaining this dependence.13
In contrast to dependencia, dependence is analysed here on four levels. 
Each level poses critical questions, although the conclusions reached with 
respect to development are not all negative.
First we can speak of cultural dependence, referring to a low degree of 
internal cultural-ideological identity and the subsequent necessity to import 
it.14 Even if such a cultural-ideological transfer were conceived as a 
positive integration of values (see integration theory), the dependence 
approach holds that under certain circumstances the transfer serves the 
stronger states without helping the poorer and might even harm the poorer 
in its inadequateness and inapplicability. In East-West terms, it focuses on 
the problem that East European societies have exchanged one set of 
cultural-ideological legitimacy (Marxism-Leninism under the hegemony of 
the Soviet Union) for another. Admittedly, there is a plurality of ideologies 
offered by the West and cultural-ideological transfer is indeed an important 
factor of integration. However since ECE societies do not dispose of a 
coherent and stable identity during the transitional phase, their choice when 
adapting cultural-ideological patterns from Western countries might be less 
than optimal (arrow, Model 3). In particular, since the essence of Western 
ideology is deregulation, free market, and free trade, i.e. neoliberalism and 
since this is also the philosophy of most of the aid programmes of Western 
states and international organisations, second best solutions for socio­
economic change and environmental reconstruction might be chosen.
Second, political dependence describes the need for external support of 
the leading elite (government) of a weaker country. Since no decisive
13 See Cordova (1973, p. 119) for a thourough discussion of the different marxist, neo- 
marxist and structural dependencia theories; see also Behrens and Noak (1984), 
Dougherty and Pflatzgraff (1990); for the distinction of dependency and dependencia see 
Caporaso (1978).
14 For an earlier discussion of this concept see Stadler (1993). Cox (1983) analyses the 
other side of cultural dependence, hegemony in cultural and ideological terms, referring 
to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. The idea is that leading transnational groups create 
a world-wide dominating ideology in the interest of the strongest states, for instance the 
‘neo-liberal free-trade’ ideology in the eighties replacing the ‘Keynesian-Listian’ 




























































































integrative political structures exist which allow conflict to be settled in an 
impartial and transparent fashion, the stronger country interferes -  directly 
or via international organisations -  in the internal political processes (see 
Model 3). This poses a problem for the democratic sovereignty. Again, 
suboptimal solutions for policies might be chosen, since democratic 
procedures are neglected and interest groups alienated. Especially when 
large scale reform programmes are at stake, it is necessary to include the 
major interest-groups (also trade unions) in the bargain, in order to make 
the bargain politically feasible, i.e. in order to avoid destructive opposition. 
In the East-West context, political dependence means that exaggerated 
external interference in the socio-economic reform programmes, mainly 
exercised by the IMF through highly conditional (i.e. political) lending, 
produces unintended and negative results, since the necessary bargaining 
processes do not take place.
Third, economic dependence conceptualises the asymmetry of economic 
power and trade relations and the vulnerability and sensitivity of dependent 
countries (Keohane and Nye. 1977). Dependence on imports of technology 
and know-how, on exports in order to finance trade and debts, on foreign 
credit, and on foreign investment is the structural basis of a country’s 
political weakness in international and bilateral bargaining on trade, debt­
servicing and matters of political integration. If this assumption holds, it 
should be possible to prove empirically that the ECE countries’ position is 
weak in East-West (i.e. EC-ECE) bargaining on debt reduction, market 
access and on aid programmes. Economic relations will not be liberal as the 
integration approach would suppose. Economic relations between East and 
West will rather be determined by protectionism and other features of 
“economic nationalism”, as outlined by Gilpin (1987, pp. 180-187).
Finally, the notion of ecological dependence depicts a two-level system 
as far as ecological standards are concerned. Higher standards are applied 
within the EC and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (especially in 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria), and a lack of regulation 
and enforcement characterises Eastern Europe. Through the Europe 
Agreement the ECE would be obliged to permit the free movement of 
goods including e.g. waste, which is considered as a commodity and 
therefore tradeable (Pestellini, 1992), but without the requirement to apply 
to EC environmental regulations. Exportation of (hazardous) waste to 
countries with less stringent regulations in exchange for badly needed hard 
currency is an obvious example of what might happen. In a disadvantageous 
bargaining position the danger of becoming the dustbin for Western Europe 
is real. In this situation, environmental problems are likely to be neglected. 




























































































reproduced by Eastern elites and populations, and in the worst case might 
lead to these areas being abandoned.15
Moreover, the internal conditions for support in Western Europe could 
change over time. The need for reconstruction and economic development 
puts Eastern Europe in a disadvantageous situation. On their own, the ECE 
countries cannot mobilise the capacities to undertake this task. For the time 
being, feelings of solidarity with ECE countries still prevail in Western 
Europe. But with growing contacts and the growing need for help this 
philo-Eastem wave could turn into xenophobia followed by a general loss 
of interest. The desire ‘to establish a new iron curtain, to construct the 
fortress (West) Europe, to build a new wall’ could be strengthened; such 
tendencies can be already found both in Germany and in Austria, which are 
the first countries ‘affected’. Other countries are likely to follow soon.
4. Summary and Discussion of Assumptions
Although much could be added to the discussion of the liberal view of 
integration and the ‘realistic’ view of dependence in this paper, several of 
the underlying assumptions are summarised in Table 1 and 2. They will 
serve as the basis for further analysis in the empirical part in chapters II 
and IV.
Table 1. Integration Assumptions
1) Support for economic devel­
opment and for cohesion, grow­
ing symmetry of economies and 
trade relations.
2) Gradual development of com­
mon inclusive political struc­
tures; conflict settlement in a 
transparent, equal way.
3) Joint development of suitable 
environmental policies.
4) Common values and policy 
aims (common vision).
5) Collective security.
6) Growing symmetrical, non­
governmental, transnational 
links.
Table 2. Dependence Assumptions
1) Asymmetrical economies and trade 
relations, biased socio-economic devel­
opment, no supportive international 
environment.
2) No common political structures, 
power play in non-transparent unequal 
bilateral relations, IO’s serve interests 
of more powerful and not of depend­
ent state.
3) Neglect of specific Eastern environ­
mental conditions.
4) Conflictive dominance of Western 
values.
5) No collective security.
6) Asymmetrical, external non-govern­
mental links.




























































































Chapter III will analyse the development of political structures in East-West 
relations (section 1), discuss some aspects of trade relations between ECE 
and the European Community, with a strong focus on the Europe 
Agreements (section 2), look at the Western aid regime and the conditions 
it imposes on Eastern Europe (section 3), and, finally, point out some 
aspects of environmental integration and dependence (section 4). Chapter 
IV will discuss implications of these international factors on the internal 
change in Eastern Europe.
III. The Western Aid Policy and its Regimes: EC, IMF, World 
Bank, EBRD and Governments (G-24)
East-West relations changed abruptly when Western governments started to 
discuss assistance programmes for ECE countries. The problem was 
especially urgent for Poland, in summer 1989, when the first non­
communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki formed a government after 
semi-free elections. From the very beginning it was clear that Poland was 
a strategic country in the transformation process of the ECE countries. 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, was not only slower in her attempts at reform, 
but is also smaller in terms of market, population, military and strategic 
importance. In relative terms, Poland and Bulgaria were the most heavily 
indebted countries of the region and they were in severe economic 
difficulties.16 *In order to show support for Hungary and Poland, on July 
14, 1989, the G-7 (presidents and prime ministers) gave the responsibility 
to the EC Commission to coordinate Western aid of 24 countries (G-24, 
which is the OECD countries less Yugoslavia). Proclaimed aims were the 
establishment of Western style democracies and market economies in ECE. 
Soon after the collapse of communism, opinions were expressed in Eastern 
and Western Europe to the effect that there was a political need for 
integration of ECE into West European political structures, in order to offer 
a stabilising framework for the difficult process of démocratisation and 
economic restructuring. For example, Dahrendorf underlined his conviction
16 The history of the economic and the debt crisis is the same for many developing
countries that tried to modernise in the 70s on the basis of foreign lending. Economic 
inefficiency, mismanagement, and the rise of interest rates at the beginning of the 
eighties tended to close export markets. Combined with other factors this ran them into
insolvency (cf. e.g. Marer, 1988). Poland lost its creditworthiness in 1981, Bulgaria in 




























































































to the press that the EC should admit the new democracies, especially 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia: “ensuring the respect for Human Rights 
and stabilising the new Rechtsstaat conditions are the most important and 
urgent objectives for the EC” . This would create a very useful kind of 
international commitment impeding the re-emergence of antidemocratic and 
chauvinist forces.17 What has happened since then in terms of policy 
towards, and integration of, the ECE and how this is continuing, will be 
reviewed in the next paragraph.
1. Political Support
Security
After the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the first non-communist 
governments since the aftermath of World War II started immediately to 
disintegrate not only their political and economic ties, but also their security 
links, which led to the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA 
in June 1991. Despite the initial willingness of the still ‘half-communist’ 
Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania, these institutions were not replaced 
by alternative forms of cooperation. At the same time, they sought political 
support and integration in the West in order to make their ‘freedom 
revolutions’ irreversible. The most appropriate and long-lasting solution 
seemed to them to be a binding, highly integrated collective security system 
developed on the basis of the CSCE structures (Dienstbier, 1990, pp. 403- 
4). However, the main Western powers were not favourable to such 
proposals, preferring the well-established structure of NATO. The Czecho­
slovak President Vaclav Havel therefore warned in March 1991 that ECE 
would disappear in a “certain political, economic and security vacuum. The 
old (..) ties have broken down, new ties develop only slowly.”18 The 
Polish government argued that Europe as a whole should develop a uniform 
security system for all countries in the area, and it opposed the existing 
division into several, different security sectors. It had been in favour of a 
security system rooted in established contacts with NATO as early as 1990, 
when it set up a liaison office in Brussels. In October 1991, Foreign 
Minister Skubiszewski remarked that Poland would be prepared to negotiate 
any form of association with NATO, including “joining the alliance 
itself” .19 During their summit meeting in October 1991 the Central
17 “ Subito l ’Est nella Cee” , La Repubblica, 2 April 1992.
18 Havel’s speech to the NATO in Brussels, 21.3.1991, Europa Archiv 10 (1991), pp. 
243-48.




























































































European countries jointly appealed for “a close and institutionalised” 
association with NATO and emphasised “the need to create conditions for 
direct inclusion in the activities of the [NATO] alliance” .20
In Bulgaria the willingness to enter NATO had been mentioned by the 
Green Party immediately after the first free elections in Summer 1990. 
Subsequently, the government took over this position. Contacts existed at 
various levels, ultimately an exchange of high-ranking delegations took 
place in November 1991. Agreements were signed. Nevertheless, formal 
membership is not yet envisaged. On the NGO level a “ Atlanticeski Klub” 
is still promoting entry to NATO “ to assure stability for a country in the 
most unstable region of Europe” .21
The results of two years of progress are encouraging, but not satisfactory 
in terms of integration. The CSCE has been enlarged, due to the emergence 
of several new states in 1991 (Croatia, Slovenia, the Baltics and the other 
Soviet Republics), but only to some extent deepened. A small ‘Centre for 
the Prevention of Conflict’ in Vienna, a small secretariat in Prague, and an 
‘Office of Free Elections’ in Warsaw, as well as a consultative 
parliamentary body of representatives of national governments, have been 
established. The Council of Ministers decided in June 1991, in an important 
departure from the CSCE principle of unanimous decision making, that no 
government (not even that of the state under discussion) could veto the 
request of another member for clarification of a “serious emergency 
situation that might arise from a violation of one of the principles of the 
[Helsinki] Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, 
security or stability.”22 *
Even if the CSCE represents an important factor, the major issues of 
European security are still decided in the framework of NATO, to which 
ECE countries still have no access. NATO itself accepts the CSCE as a 
competent institution for stability in Europe, but clearly does not favour full 
membership on the part of ECE countries (NATO 1991, Resolution 232). 
As a way of compensating for this, the foreign ministers of the USA and 
Germany, Baker and Genscher, initiated a ‘North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council’, which is close to having an observer status. This institutional 
change can be interpreted as an important step in the direction of common
20 Rzeczpospolita, 6.10.1991.
21 Interview with Solomon Pasi in Sofia, 15 November 1991.





























































































security. NATO also declared there to be “ inseparable links between 
Western and Eastern security” .23
Governmental and Non-governmental Links
One important feature of political support for the new ECE governments 
was the establishment of a net of cooperation treaties between the ECE and 
Germany, France, UK, Italy, and other West European countries. Political 
support was expressed on this bilateral level mainly in the form of 
economic assistance, by offering more cooperation on the cultural and 
scientific level, and by negotiating general issues of a multilateral character 
on a bilateral level. Frameworks for the establishment of non-governmental 
links between ECE and Western countries were also introduced on a 
bilateral level. Politically significant were the various efforts by West 
European party confederations to support the development of parties in the 
ECE that would operate as political partners. The European Democratic 
Union for example initiated contacts everywhere with conservative- 
democratic forces and opened a political research and education centre in 
Budapest. The Socialist International acted in much the same way on the 
left-democratic political scene. The Liberal International and the Greens 
built up their own networks with equivalent groups. In particular the 
German parties expanded their network of ‘political education centres’.24 
This institutionalised political dialogue was a welcome device for ECE 
politicians to further their goals and it provided the possibility for West 
European parties not only to increase their political influence, but also to 
demonstrate their good will and concern about developments in the ECE.
Council of Europe
An important step towards political integration in terms of values, human 
rights and freedoms was the opening of the Council of Europe to the ECE. 
Hungary and the CSFR had already become members in 1990, Poland 
became a member at the end of 1991 after free parliamentary elections, 
Bulgaria still has an observer status. The nature of the Council of Europe 
ideally reflects the conditions of integration as described in Model 2.
23 See the Declaration on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 20.12.1991, in 
Europa-Archiv 2/92.
24 These centers are practically influential party-embassies. For the CDU the Konrad 






























































































On 13 June 1990, bilateral declarations on cooperation were signed by 
Hungary, Poland, and the CSFR with the EFTA, providing for gradual trade 
liberalisation and economic cooperation. This was extended in an agreement 
on a free trade area until 2002, which is rather similar to the three 
countries’ agreement with the EC. Agricultural products remain largely 
excluded. A provision for the creation of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) between EFTA and EC was added (East-West, 1992, p. 5). A ‘mixed 
council’ was established that meets yearly. In a second step, free trade 
agreements are envisaged that should bring the ECE into the EEA (Lippert, 
1990/1, p. 369). After 1989, trade with ECE declined (mainly due to the 
decay of EFTA-Soviet trade). However, trade with the three Visegrad 
countries has increased, mainly concentrated on Austria, with 70% of EFTA 
exports and 52% of EFTA imports. Nevertheless, the relative size is quite 
small, about US$22m -  compared to US$6.7 billion with the far away 
‘Dynamic Asian Economies’ (DAE) (EFTA, 1991, pp. 38ff).
2. The Europe Agreements
The most important accomplishment in Western aid was the conclusion of 
the Europe Agreements in November 1991, agreements on association with 
the EC, reached after more than a year of intense negotiations. Initially, in 
August 1990, the EC Commission presented a very general scheme for 
bilateral association agreements with Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR,25 
which was to go beyond the just accorded trade and cooperation 
agreements. A free trade area was the economic aim; the institutionalisation 
of a political dialogue in the framework of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) was the political aim. Further elements were technical, 
industrial, and scientific cooperation as well as financial assistance. 
Negotiations about this proposal began -  after explorative discussions -  
officially in December 1990.26
Conflict between ECE and EC-members arose because the EC was not 
willing to explicitly include in the text the option of full membership for 
the associated countries. There was also significant dispute about the extent 
of EC trade liberalisation, where especially the southern European countries, 
like Greece, Portugal and Spain, objected strongly to far-reaching market
25 See COM (90)398 final, 27.8.1990; Lippert (1990, p. 369).
26 Explorative talks finished in October 1990, cf. VWD-Europa, 24.10.1991. Talks with 




























































































access in the most important, so-called sensitive sectors, such as agricultural 
products, textiles, steel and automobiles. Nor did the EC originally intend 
to concede the important freedom of personal movement of workers to the 
three countries (Mahr, 1990). At a certain point in the negotiations, the 
Polish delegation threatened to call off further talks, increasing thereby the 
political pressure on the EC. It was probably much to the benefit of the 
bargaining strength of the three Central European countries that an 
‘operational alliance’ was created after a trilateral meeting in Vise grad in 
February 1991, where a joint policy for negotiations with the EC was 
decided.27 Negotiations were able to continue only after the Council of 
Ministers’s decision on a more flexible and wider mandate for the 
Commission.28
In the final draft of the agreements that were signed formally on 16 
December 1991 (but have still to be approved by the 15 European 
governments and parliaments) the EC recognised “ the fact that the final 
objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this 
association, in the view of the parties, will help to achieve this objective” . 
The negotiations have produced a number of results, including the 
establishment of the following policy areas and aims, as well as the setting 
up of certain organs.
An Association Council is the key-organ of the individual agreement, 
where the EC-member states, the Commission and the associated state are 
represented. It meets at a ministerial level at least once a year. An 
Association Committee is subordinated to the Council and consists basically 
of senior civil servants, representing the council members. Additionally a 
strictly consultative parliamentary body with the right to information will 
be established.29 Mahr summarises this set-up as follows:
On the political aspects, these agreements represent progress, as they at least create
bilateral forums for a dialogue, although this bilateral approach is reminiscent of the
27 However, Poland’s proposal to establish a permanent institutional body that would 
coordinate activities between the three countries was not accepted by Hungary and the 
CSFR, nor was the idea of a free trade zone or a joint government-sponsored banking 
system. The Hungarian side regarded this deepening of the triangle cooperation as a 
mistake, since it would slow down the process of integration into West European 
institutions. In November 1991, the three countries reached an agreement to liberalise 
trade over the next five years.
28 The committees continued serious discussions in September 1991.
29 The Association agreement is very similar to the European Community itself: the all 





























































































‘divide et impera’ option, and does not really guarantee an emancipated dialogue but 
means only a taking over of Community decisions by these countries (...). (1991, p. 
32.)
Concerning industrial free trade, tariffs and quotas are to be phased out 
by both parties. The EC is liberalising in the first 5 years, although it will 
still keep some quotas and customs duties in the sensitive areas,30 while 
the associated countries reduce their protection more slowly in the course 
of the second phase of five years, which completes the transitional phase 
of ten years. Beyond the trade-liberalisation, the agreements provide, in a 
long term perspective, for political, technical, and juridical assistance in 
order to bring the national standards of the three countries into harmony 
with the EC acquis, similar to the provisions of the European Economic 
Area Treaty that the EC has negotiated with the EFTA countries.
The complicated agricultural settlement with the multitude of quotas and i 
ceilings in different annexes of the agreement will probably remain, j 
Agricultural trade liberalisation could provide for some quick enlargement 
of ECE trade shares in the EC; however, this seems unlikely due to the 
complicated operation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC 
(Pinder, 1991, p. 64).
Concerning the movement of people, legally working citizens from the 
associated countries have to be treated in the same way as EC citizens. This 
means that there will be no legalisation for illegally working CEC citizens, 
something which was originally demanded by the Polish side. “Just as 
vague and non-committal are the provisions for the second stage, stating 
that the Association Council shall examine ways of improving the 
movement of workers “taking into account the economic and social 
conditions in Hungary, Poland and the CSFR [and] provided the 
employment situation in the Community allows” (Mahr, 1990). The hope 
of Pinder (1991, p. 69), that a more liberal approach would “contribute to 
integration at the level of populations” , is thus far from being realistic.
Supportive to the integration approach are the agreements on economic 
cooperation and assistance, including monetary cooperation, wide-ranging 
sectoral support in industry, education and the environment as well as the 
notion of environmental and social sustainability. The agreements are on the 
other hand explicitly tied to severe political and economic conditionality,
30 Steel duties will be cut by 50% in the first and 50% in the second year by the EC. 
The coal sector customs will be reduced annually by 20%. Textiles are separately 
negotiated in the Uruguay-Round of the GATT, but the EC agreed, despite Greek and 
Portuguese opposition, to eliminate its textile tariffs by the end of the transitional period 




























































































which could theoretically lead to their suspension if progress towards 
market economy or democracy is interrupted.
From both an integration and a dependence point of view, the following 
criticisms could be put forward:
-  there is too little trade liberalisation in the sensitive areas and the 
adjustment period for the associated countries is too short: nobody can 
imagine that their economies will be considerably better off in ten years, 
since most of them are still decline even in 1992;
-  not even small steps are taken in the direction of free movement of 
labour;
-  the institutional approach is bilateral (De Largentaye, 1993) and 
asymmetrical31 *, the associates are deemed to be policy takers;
-  the restrictions on state subsidies affect the three countries much deeper 
than the EC.
In July 1991, Bulgaria -  after having declared its interest several times in 
little more than a year -  was the fourth country to be invited to negotiate 
an association agreement with the EC. “The time has come for Bulgaria to 
take its place in the new architecture of the European continent” , as the 
letter of Jacques Delors put it (Engelbrekt, 1991, p. 7). The extension of the 
Europe agreements to Bulgaria and Romania was envisaged in January 
1992. Concrete negotiations on their inclusion started in March 1992 (East- 
West no. 528, 16 January 1992, p. 2).
Central European Initiative (CEI)
The Central European Initiative (former Penta- and Hexagonal) consists of 
Czechoslovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, and Poland. It 
provides a structure aiming at pragmatic cultural, political and economic 
cooperation in the region. On November 12, 1991, the EBRD agreed to act 
as the official secretariat for economic matters of the CEI. The role which 
is played by the Initiative is clearly an integrationist one, but its relevance 
is marginal. However, on a regional level the working groups (for example 
on the environment) aim at strengthening cooperation at lower levels.
31 Notwithstanding some minor advantages for the CEC on time limits for import 
liberalisation the asymmetry favours the EC -  in contrast to what an article in East-West 




























































































3. Aid Regime and Conditionality
The existing aid regime sheds some light on both interpretations of East- 
West relations. On the one hand, there is a strong general rhetorical 
commitment to the liberal and integrationist values mentioned above; on the 
other hand, there is a conflict of values not only between the donors and the 
recipients, but also among the donors themselves. This is visible in the 
emergence of the international aid regime*1, with its most prominent 
multilateral agencies the IMF, WB, EBRD and the EC. Those international 
organisations have kept each other informed, collaborated closely, 
complemented each other in their activities, and have operated with a 
common set of principles:
-  Assistance for the modernisation of ECE’s should be geared to quick 
orthodox macro-economic stabilisation, the rapid introduction of a market 
economy, trade liberalisation and instantaneous privatisation.33
-  The ECE’s debt from the communist time has generally not been 
forgiven (with the exception of 50% of Poland’s debt to the Paris Club, 
see below) and the restoration of external imbalance (debt repayment and 
trade deficit) is a top priority. Aid is mainly given in the form of advice, 
technical assistance, export credits on sound banking principles, and soft 
loans for macroeconomic stabilisation and balance payments financing.
-  Most resources for the reconstruction of the ECE should be generated 
domestically or take the form of foreign-direct investment. Aid from the 
West is ‘help’ for ‘self-help’. It is intended first of all to support the 
emerging private sector and facilitate the reconstruction of ECE but it is 
not seen as the main promoter of economic development.
-  Recipient countries are bound to high conditionality in order to avoid 
reform-stops and a waste of international investments.
These principles reflect liberal, but not integrationist (no political 
institutions and weak developmental character) ideas incorporated in the 
founding charters of the various international organisations. They reflect the
32 The term ‘international regime’ is used -  without theoretical intentions -  in order to 
analyse the interplay, common objectives and differences of these international 
organisations. It refers to John Ruggie who defined regimes “ as a set of mutual 
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, and organisational energies, and financial 
commitments that have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie, 1975, p. 570).
33 See the two volumes European Economy (CEC 1991/2), and the UN-EC study 
(1991a), devoted to Central and Eastern Europe, for summaries and discussion of 




























































































awareness that the cost of reconstructing the ECE will be too high to be 
financed out of the funds of international organisations or individual donor 
governments. In terms of domestic economic policy, they reflect an 
orthodox-neoliberal vision of economic policy.
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
Conflict and cohesion in the international aid regime can be well observed 
in the history of the EBRD, set up specifically in order to establish 
democracy and market economy in Eastern Europe. The establishment of 
the EBRD was first proposed in a speech by the French President François 
Mitterrand in October 1989, soon after the collapse of the communist 
governments. Initial discussions between the Western countries that signed 
up as prospective share-holders reflected certain conflicting ideas about the 
Bank’s role. The USA, as the largest single shareholder demanded (together 
with Britain) that the EBRD should direct most of its energies towards 
aiding the private sector. By contrast, the French government envisaged a 
more interventionist and infrastructural role for the bank. Whatever the 
competing ideas of the larger shareholders (we doubt that somebody has 
seriously asked the ECE about their opinions, but this needs further 
research!), its Founding Agreement explicitly commits it to promoting a 
political and economic transformation towards multi-party democracy and 
market economies. It also specifies that at least 60% of all loans should go 
to the private sector, that loans will be distributed on sound banking 
principles, which according to EBRD rules means that projects would be 
feasible even if they paid above London Inter-bank Offered Rates (EBRD, 
1991). The bank’s (since June 1993 former) President Jacques Attali has 
always proclaimed his belief that it should act as “the vanguard of the 
private sector” .34
Since it started work in April 1991, activities of the EBRD have been 
mainly project oriented, i.e. promoting foreign investments in industry and 
telecommunications, which is argued to be necessary if further private 
capital is to be attracted. According to Attali, the bank also negotiates 
buying shares in ECE print médias and TV-companies. It aims to help in 
establishing parliaments, constitutions, organising local administrations and 
writing tax- and trade law.35 The EBRD is also collaborating closely with 
the other multilateral institutions involved in the aid regime. It has a special 
unit devoted to co-financing specific projects. It has signed formal 
cooperation agreements with governments and institutions, including the
34 See Michael Hughes (1992, p. 39).




























































































EC, whose PHARE programme has played a more important role. So far, 
only a few projects have been actually decided on and brought to 
realisation, and financing has been limited, totalling ca. 150m ecus until the 
end of 1991, and 620m ecus in the Bank’s first year of existence.
World Bank
In principle, the WB’s activities are 
similar to those envisaged by the 
EBRD. However, in practice, the WB 
has been more active, in particular in 
Poland since 1986, when this country 
joined the Bretton Woods institutions.
It offers general policy assistance for 
transformation programmes through 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs).
The WB supports major policy and 
institutional measures in the financial 
and the private sector development, 
including privatisation, restructuring 
of the enterprise sector, establishment 
of a social security net. and of 
employment and training services.
SALs are ‘quick-disbursing’ and 
provide also a balance of payment 
support. The WB offers also 
infrastructural financing in transport 
and telecommunication, energy, 
environment and human resource development (see Table 3).
International Monetary Fund
The activities of the IMF reflect an important characteristic of the aid 
regime: the principle that the donors are entitled to make wide-ranging 
policy prescriptions to recipients. While this could be interpreted as an 
infringement of national sovereignty, most ECE governments have generally 
been happy to accept this principle. First, their own blueprint of reform 
often envisages an economic system not unlike that sought by the IMF. The 
Fund’s main demands have been a) the establishment of macro-economic 
stability through cuts in public expenditure and b) devaluation in order to 
increase exports for the debt service. Linked to world market integration, 
the fund has also conditioned its help on rapid trade liberalisation and 
privatisation. Secondly, the Fund has given wide-ranging financial and
Table 3. World Bank Activities in 
Poland and Bulgaria, 1990-91 (Million
US$)
Poland







































































































technical assistance and political Table 4. IMF Engagement in Poland and 
support for reform programmes (see Bulgaria (Million SDRs)
Table 4).
Recipient countries have not 
been in a position to reject the 
IMF’s conditions, since the 
alternative would have been 
economic collapse without the 
prospect of aid. The IMF’s position 
has also been of utmost importance 
to the ECE as it represents the 
policy leader of the whole 
international aid regime in that all 
other bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives are linked to the 
agreement between the recipient 
and the IMF. In terms of foreign 
policy, the IMF has therefore been 
the key to the whole of Western 
assistance, whereas in terms of 
domestic policy, it has reinforced 
and legitimised the various 
governm ents ’ austerity /re  form 
programmes vis-à-vis social and political opposition. This was clearly 
visible for example in Poland in 1991. when she was not able to draw the 
second tranche of its extended fund facility (SDR 102m). because it had 
failed to meet key performance criteria.'16 The main reasons for the conflict 
were pressures of interest-groups (especially the trade unions) against the 
further harsh budget cuts and radical privatisation plans, which involved 
reducing income and accelerating lay-offs of workers (Stadler, 1993).
The G-24 Aid Programme (including EC’s PHARE)
Within the international aid regime, there has been a sub-regime in the form 
of the G-24 ECE-assistance, which was linked in policy terms to IMF 
guidance.17 According to the EC, which coordinates the G-24 effort within 
its PHARE Unit, 24.7 billion ecus (US$31 bn) had been pledged or
Poland (Quota 680):
Standby-Credit (1990) 509
18.4.1991 - 17.4.1994 





15.3.91 - 14.3.92 
Standby-Credit 279
CCFF 170.7
Source: EC E . 1991.
16 Financial Times, 18.8.1991.
17 See the Action Plan (CEC, 1990) which tries to coordinate assistance by the G-24 





























































































committed by donor countries by Table 5. G-24 Assistance to Poland and
the end of May 1991 (UN-ECE Bulgaria 1989-91 (Billion US$)
1991). The support for economic 
and political reform included 
increased access to Western 
markets, macro-economic loans to 
assist the balance of payments and 
currency stabilisation, project 
finance and technical assistance, as 
well as environmental cooperation 
and some short-term humanitarian 
aid.
Debt-Reduction for Poland
Although chiefly economic in its character, the substantial reduction of 
Poland’s external debt was also an important sign of political support. At 
the beginning of 1991 Poland’s foreign debt had reached US$48.5 billion, 
of which about $33.3 billion was owed to the Paris Club, the association of 
Western creditor countries, ca. $11 billion to commercial banks and the rest 
to other creditors. In March 1991 the Paris Club agreed to write off about 
half the official debt. The agreement provided for a gradual reduction, 
whereby it would be reduced by 30% over the following three years if the 
country succeeded in transforming its economy according to the 
requirements laid down by the IMF. A further 20% was to be written off 
in 1994 if all the IMF’s conditions had been met by that time. The 
agreement also provided for the granting of debt relief beyond the 50% 
reduction and the voluntary conversion of up to 10% of the debt into equity 
in privatised Polish companies or other forms of commercial investment in 
Poland, particularly in environmental projects. Shortly after the agreement 
had been concluded, the USA and France announced plans to reduce 
Poland’s indebtedness by a further 20% and 10%, respectively, by either 
partly or fully converting those debts into specific environmental projects 
to be funded by Poland in Zloties (Weydenthal, 1991). It has, however, to 
be noted that Poland, since it had not serviced the bulk of her debt before, 
has to pay back in real terms more than before the reduction. Additionally, 
the absolute total of foreign debt will not be reduced, since most of the 
support in the framework of the aid regime has been in form of repayable 
credits.
Against the impressive background of this international aid regime, it is 
important to note several counterproductive trends in terms of integration:
Bulgaria Poland
Restructuring 0.1 1.8




IMF lending) 0.8 1.0




























































































-  Most ECE countries, especially Poland and Bulgaria, experienced a 
substantial net outward transfer of financial resources in 1990, caused 
mainly by the outflow of private capital and by the servicing of foreign 
debt, which more than offset inflows of financial assistance from the 
West (ECE, 1991, p. 88). Since domestic savings, i.e. the basis for 
investments, have been drained by very restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies, the modernisation of ECE is threatened. This in turn is 
counterproductive in terms of integration and strengthens the dependence 
situation of ECE.
-  One third of the credits are in the form of investment and credit 
guarantees, which will not be activated before the recipients meet their 
contractual obligations (Mihaly and Smolik, 1991).
-  Credits and grants offered by the G-24 are frequently targeted to 
encourage companies from the donor countries38 as well as non-profit 
organisations (for example universities, consulting firms and consultants, 
research institutes) (Mihaly and Smolik, 1991)
-  More than 40% of credits have been offered on a commercial basis. ECE 
enterprises and states often cannot afford the high interest rates. Hence, 
much of fresh credit lines remain unutilised.
-  Most of the assistance is debt creating. If the present Western policy is 
continued, it is likely that the financial burden will become even greater 
unless aid and reforms stimulate strong export growth (Neue Züricher 
Zeitung, 20.9.1991).
Trade Liberalisation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
According to the liberal/integration approach, mutual trade increase is a key 
issue in East-West relations. Consequently, the concessions that were made 
by both sides in abolishing the mutually exclusive post-cold war trade 
regime contribute to integration into the world economy. The West largely 
abolished the remaining export-restrictions under the COCOM regime and 
introduced GATT-conform import regulations for the ECE, including the 
Most Favourite Nation treatment and the General System of Preferences, the 
latter being applied usually only to Thirld World countries. The concessions 
that were made by the EC in the framework of the Europe Agreements can 
be quoted as an outstanding example in support of the integration- 
assumption, despite some difficulties during the negotiating process and 
some shortcomings that were discussed above.
The ECE largely abandoned state-managed trade, and introduced GATT 
conform import rules with rapid import and export liberalisation to an





























































































initially low protection level, which made a far ranging penetration by 
Western firms possible. Also, by abandoning the ECE trade-system CMEA, 
trade was radically diverted in favour of the West. Starting from a clearly 
asymmetrical balance of East-West trade, Poland for one (but also CSFR 
and Hungary) was able not only to increase sharply the overall amount of 
exports to the West (especially to the Eastern EC area), but also to shift 
exports in favour of more highly processed goods (UN-ECE, 1991, p. 90) 
in the period 1989-91. At the same time, imports multiplied and contributed 
to a modest, limited amount of capital modernisation in a limited number 
of sectors.
The overall impact of the trade measures taken by the West is difficult 
to assess and this is not the purpose of this paper. However, Mihaly and 
Smolik consider that the liberalisation (in the package of the G-24 support) 
has had a strong impact on some Eastern exports.
In the longer term, the Eastern countries could derive large benefits from the dynamic 
effects of trade liberalisation if the reforms succeed in improving the competitiveness 
of Eastern manufactures and result in a more world market oriented trade policy. 
(1991, p. 209.)
Although FDI obviously is not ‘assistance’, the liberal integration and the 
dependence approach would perceive it to be a key element in modernising 
the ECE. Despite the clear difference between long-term large-scale 
corporate investment (like the share of FIAT in the Polish car producer 
FSM, and General Motors’ share in FSO) and small-scale investors that 
sometimes behave like pirates, there is a general understanding about the 
importance and desirability of FDI. Still, the impressive number of 4350 
and 800 joint ventures in Poland and Bulgaria respectively, should not 
obscure the fact that the stock of FDI for example in Poland was worth 
only US$200m (UN-ECE, 1991, p. 102).
4. Environmental Aid
Partly contained within economic aid and partly separate from it, 
environmental aid stands for specific transfers in the environmental area. As 
above, the political, stmctural, financial and juridical aspects will be 
discussed separately. High-level declarations of goodwill and recognition 
of the need for environmental protection and cleanup in ECE are frequent. 






























































































More than elsewhere in Europe the environmental issue simply cannot be 
a marginal concern in the East:
Environmental deterioration has reached such alarming proportions that economic 
growth itself is necessarily predicated on restoring the environment. Even the most 
basic conditions of production -  access to such fundamental resources as uncontami­
nated water, land and air -  can no longer be taken for granted and require direct 
restorative investments before economic growth can be rekindled (Reed 1990, p. 3).
Recognition of the inseparable character of environmental problems already 
partially existed before 1989. Transboundary pollution from Eastern Europe 
had particularly affected the neighbouring countries. In some cases money 
was spent to greater effect in Eastern countries in an effort to lower 
pollution in the West. This process has increased with the fall of the iron 
curtain. Knowledge of the real environmental deterioration in Eastern 
Europe has spread widely and made its way through the Western media. 
The danger of nuclear pollution in the West is the clearest one: Western 
countries not only see that they are affected, but also recognise their own 
responsibility. At least in this field pan-European cooperation seems to be 
feasible. At a meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki the Belorussian foreign 
minister declared the intention of the former Soviet republics to 
denuclearise and asked for a pool of international experts to supervise the 
security measures at the nuclear plants and to elaborate a European Ecology 
Map. At the G-7 meeting in July 1992 one of the major themes was 
precisely the situation of the Eastern nuclear industry.
Obtaining a similar general recognition of responsibility as regards 
environmental questions in Eastern societies in general is one of the most 
important tasks: in the long run environmental education has to bring about 
changes in life-style, which are comparable (though different) to the 
changes that have already occurred in the West.
It is interesting to consider a 33-point-program on industrial development 
which was developed at a conference sponsored by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) held last November in Zaborow/Poland. 
This document emphasises two points: on the one hand, it suggests a 
detailed step-by-step scheme for the rapid economic reconstruction of 
Eastern Europe, recognising that the basic problem is the lack of capital for 
investment. On the other hand, its cost-benefit-analysis is closely connected 
with the principle of environmental sustainability as a way of ensuring the 
lowest possible expenses for energy requirements, protection of natural 





























































































The experts’ argumentation includes concern for continuing 
competitiveness through employment creation and the search for suitable 
export markets, pointing out the benefits of sustainable development. These 
range from immediate financial savings through efficient energy use, and 
a shift to environmental services and technology sectors with higher product 
quality, on the one hand, to social effects as improved worker morale, 
education and research aspects, on the other hand. A central role is given 
to the dissemination of information about these concepts.
Evgeni Popov, economic advisor to the Bulgarian parliament, in his 
contribution to the conference stressed the role of indirect payment in the 
necessary privatisation of state property. Empty portfolios impede an 
efficient use of the polluter-pays-principle for compensation and 
reconstruction of environmental damage. Popov therefore put forward the 
idea of payment by shares of the polluter’s property, which tries to 
harmonise two crucial issues -  privatisation and environmental 
reconstruction -  with the following advantages:
-  to reduce tension between polluters (and their employees) and the 
affected population through some compensation:
-  to introduce new share-holders, who have a personal interest in an 
environmentally sound performance, into the decision-making-process;
-  to avoid a sell-out of national property to foreign investors, who prefer 
new investments (like in East Germany) to the reconstruction of existing 
structures -  something which is not in accord with the principle of 
sustainable development;
-  to achieve indirect effects, e.g. a reduction of wind and water erosion if 
intensively exploited soil with single-crop farming is sub-divided through 
privatisation into extensively used smaller units.
Among the growing literature on ‘Environment and Eastern Europe’ the 
findings of the above mentioned conference stand out by reason of their 
profound knowledge of the situation and their adaptability to real situations. 
As Popov said in an interview:
It is no use to talk abstractly. Agriculture has to be developed -  fine! But we must 
be more precise: which products, where, by which means, for which market: sheep 
cheese or dairy yoghurt, these are the relevant questions.39
To Western ears some points might seem obvious. During recent 
missions to Eastern Europe, however, the reality of the situation proved to




























































































be quite different. Even a minority of Western ‘experts’, and most national 
decision makers in the ECE countries have doubts about the chances of the 
introduction of ecological considerations -  they consider it a luxury for 
advanced rich societies. Those who have no money — in their opinion -  
simply have to forget about the environment for the near future. The 
Zaborow declaration closes with the following appeals:
Historically industrial development in Central and Eastern Europe has been 
accompanied by substantial environmental degradation and damage for human health. 
In contrast, the prospective industrial restructuring of the region can yield benefits to 
public health and the environment of unprecedented magnitude. Political and 
economic changes are occurring rapidly in Central and Eastern Europe. Decisions on 
the future shape of this part of the world are currently being taken. The time to act 
is now!
Common Responsibility
The transfer of a functioning legal system, experience in enforcement and 
monitoring and the introduction of advanced environmental technology 
represents the only possible chance of a ‘leap-frogging’ to Western 
standards. Moreover, obvious undesirable developments could be avoided 
right from the start. The ecological question might even become a factor 
favouring integration: conflicting interests are likely to loose their weight, 
and symmetrical problem-solving should become more frequent with the 
growing awareness that environmental risk is a common and indivisible 
European problem (see Model 4).
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Western Europe will give an increasing weight to require of trading partners to 
conform their environmental standards, and there will be increasing pressure to use 
tariffs and other fiscal instruments to enforce such requirements (Smith 1991, p. 11).
With the EC law getting more and more severe and effective, but 
implementation also more expensive, the Eastern states could take 
advantage from the fact that they are situated near to the EC and free-ride 
on the environmental policy of the EC. The most successful way to avoid 
asymmetric competitiveness would be precisely to bind them into the 
Community’s regulations.
Eastern Europe might even become the laboratory for sophisticated 
environmental management, where Western firms can develop and apply the 
industry of the future -  also of Western countries. This becomes all the 
more important, given that Western environmental policy is more and more 
guided by the principle of Integrated Pollution Control, which tends to 
produce less uniform solutions, but specially designed concepts for diverse 
geographic and social situations.
At any rate, with growing integration, the environmental impacts are 
going to rise. As an example, within the EC until 2010 a rise of S 02 and 
NOx emissions (between 8-9% and 12-14% respectively) is predicted as a 
consequence of growing economic exchanges in the Internal Market, 
notwithstanding technological improvements. Growing East-West trade is 
also expected to increase the environmental problems for both sides.
A complete integration into the Western system in the short or medium 
term is in any case impossible. The example of the GDR shows that 
problems tend rather to be underestimated and costs are likely to rise 
throughout the process (Bachmann, 1993, chapter 1). Moreover, the amount 
of money, concern and political willingness present in the German case, are 
far from being reached in the cases of the other Eastern countries.
Structures
Regional institutions whose task is to deal with specific transnational 
environmental hot spots already exist, (some even dating from Communist 
times), and need further reinforcement. For the Baltic Sea, the Danube 
Basin and the Black Sea these instances of cooperation involve both Eastern 
and Western countries and have an integrative character.
Especially the Regional Environmental Centre Budapest (REC) is 
dedicated to improving the internal institutional structures of the Eastern 
countries. Projects are proposed by the country itself, sometimes by a 
governmental entity, sometimes by a NGO or a scientific unit. The REC is 
responsible for the selection of projects, and manages the funding. Projects 




























































































business-oriented projects. The multinational composition of the private, 
non-profit-making REC, with staff-members from all the countries involved 
and preferably chosen from NGOs, helps to assure that aid is properly need- 
oriented. The Centre was first announced by George Bush (hence its 
nickname ‘Bush-Centre’) and is also partly US-financed (mainly through 
the Soros Foundation). Other donors are to be found in most Western 
countries (mainly the EC, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands); the 
Hungarian government is also a donor (REC Information Bulletin, no. 4, 
December 1991).
On the EC’s side, commitment to the environment has been declared an 
integral component of the PHARE Programme. A report Environment 
Sector Strategy for ECE was drafted by German experts, completed by the 
Commission and presented at the Dobris Castle meeting to the 
environmental ministers of both the G-24 and ECE in June 1991. It 
“ focuses on alleviating the principal constraints hindering the 
implementation of the environmental reform itself” (Hull, 1991, p. 11), that 
is, concrete priority interventions:
[The goal of the Ecology Plan] is to establish and strengthen self-financing 
mechanisms for environmental protection measures [in ECE countries]. The 
environmental cleanup in these countries has to be achieved together with and by 
(emphasis added) the economical set-ups and reconstruction ... it has to be 
accompanied by the creation of a juridical and administrative framework which 
produces high environmental standards and offers a reliable basis to investors, and 
a program of environmental education and spread of knowledge... (Bundesminister, 
1991, p. 114.)
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its explicit 
insistence on environmental criteria and an Environmental Impact 
Assessment for all projects, contrasts with the Bank’s engagement in a 
transnational nuclear holding, whose aim is to update Eastern nuclear plants 
(Wochenpresse, 9.4.1992). Great hopes had been vested in the Bank from 
an environmentalist point of view. Even before it came into existence the 
WWF called it “an environmental opportunity” (see Reed, 1991). Due to 
the fact that the bank has only been in existence for a short time and given 
that only a small amount of money has actually been spent so far, the 
environmental impact of the Bank itself still has to be assessed.
The decisions about project funding are taken unilaterally, but ECE 
countries are represented in the different advisory boards of the bank 
(EBRD, 1991, pp. 5-6). The Bank is committed to “promote in full range 
of its abilities (emphasis added) environmentally sound and sustainable 
development” . Hence it does not promote environmental reconstruction as 




























































































environmentally sustainable targets (EBRD, 1992a, Annex 1). The 
environmental review procedure can rather act as an obstacle to the 
realisation of unsound projects, and as a way of avoiding additional 
pollution in the future (which is fine for environmental goals, but not 
enough).
The main criterion so far has been the Bank’s profit, based on a rather 
short-term benefit-reasoning. One of the major projects accepted is a 
General Motors plant in Hungary -  economically sound, clearly less liable 
to pollute than former car industries, but not compatible with environmental 
sustainability as it increases the number of cars in ECE.
As an equity holder in a private venture, the Bank’s role is stronger, 
because it takes over some liability. Since it is only an investment and 
development bank, other very effective measures like energy efficiency 
improvement (saving potentials up to 40%) or infrastructural action do not 
fit into the Bank’s field of action.
Although acting with little integrationist attitude the Bank could 
eventually play a very active role, at least as environmentally sound 
developments are concerned. Projects could be introduced for environmental 
reconstruction and cleanup as a long term investment. This would increase 
the over-all role of the EBRD in policy terms, and lead to a more extensive 
use of the Bank’s capital.
Bi-lateral cooperation in the environmental field between Western and 
Eastern governments is widespread. The most intensive activity has been 
established between neighbouring countries, such as Germany, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia as far as the so-called ‘Salesian Triangle’ is concerned 
(Bundesminister, 1991).
Appropriate Funds
Given the potential of the Western economies and the East’s urgent need 
for aid, what has been done so far is hardly sufficient. A United Nations 
officer accused the West of “being stingy vis a vis Eastern Europe” (La 
Repubblica, 4 April 1992). Little money has been distributed by the 
EBRD,40 and the scarce funding for public entities limits the Bank’s 
influence to a still smaller sector of the economies undergoing change. As 
far as the environment is concerned, it was even less influential: in Bulgaria 
in 1991 93% of the industry was still state property; emerging private 
companies were mostly in the service sector or small-scale manufacturing 
concerns, whereas the big polluters were state owned. After one year, only
40 However, bank officials claimed during an interview series that there are several 




























































































620m ecus of the 10 billion available (Financial Times, 15 April 1992) 
have been distributed, and there are no specific environmental programmes 
among the awarded loans.
After the Dobris meeting the regional environmental programmes of 
PHARE were created, the expected expenditure being in the order of 20m 
ecus. A regional nuclear safety programme was also funded with 15m ecus. 
Nevertheless, there is general awareness, that several billions of Ecu would 
be necessary to reduce continuing environmental damage. The Dobris 
meeting is supposed to develop into a regular meeting, and the second 
ministerial meeting took place in Switzerland in early 1993 (Baumgartl, 
1993a).
The EC Task Force for the European Environmental Agency is currently 
working on a real Pan-European environmental programme and the EC’s 
role in it. However, it can by no means be taken for granted that this 
programme will actually be put into effect.
For a private institution, high amounts of money were made available 
through the above mentioned Soros-Foundation. In various countries the 
Open University Foundation is building up educational structures through 
the Open University Foundation. In the case of the Central European 
University, there is a special emphasis on environmental studies.
Debt-for-Nature-Swaps
A possible solution for the present incompatibility between the gigantic 
financial problems ECE faces41 and the need for expensive environmental 
reconstruction might be to rely on an unusual instrument: debt-for-nature- 
swaps. In its present form, it has been used mostly in Third World 
countries, mostly on private initiative and for purposes of nature 
conservation. This has meant that it has made only a marginal contribution 
(Schreiber, 1989, p. 342).
In an adapted version, a concept of ‘debt-for-ecology’ (or -  depending 
on the viewpoint and the mutual benefit -  also ecology-for-debt) swaps 
could relieve ECE temporarily from its debt repayments. Particularly for 
Bulgaria with its appalling foreign debt, its inability to serve it,42 and its
41 Bulgaria would be paying -  had it not suspended re-payment in 1990 -  more than 
half of its hard-currency revenue for debt service. Even worse, most of the debt (80%) 
is owed to the commercial banks of the ‘London Club’, which is a tougher negotiating 
partner than governments’ banks (the ‘Paris Club’, which actually already rescheduled 
part of Bulgaria’s debt).





























































































serious environmental problems such a regime might be the only possibility 
to promote action.
The benefits for the Eastern country concerned are obvious and, above 
all, would materialise without delay. But there are also advantages for 
Western creditors:
-  Decreasing environmental deterioration and pollution has a side effect 
also on the Western countries. This applies even more when global 
climate change or ozone depletion are taken into consideration.
-  Secondary effects could be expected from the fact that better 
environmental conditions would favour subsequent investments (which 
would create a future credit market and thus act as a source of gains for 
investment banks).
-  Rather than having to admit responsibility for irresponsible loans to 
communist governments -  especially in the second half of the 1980s43 
-  they could reschedule claims ‘for the good of the environment’. Such 
a good-will decision would have a direct effect on public opinion, and 
would be especially appropriate for commercial banks and their image.
-  Inclusion of environmental issues in high-level and top-priority 
negotiations would strengthen the role of domestic environmental 
movements, NGOs and policy-makers, which would further contribute to 
increasing awareness in the debtor country.
First attempts at establishing similar procedures were made in Poland with 
the involvement of the National Bank. The results were sufficiently good 
to allow experts to suggest extending the experience -  which had started 
with developing countries -  to the rest of Eastern Europe (Schreiber, 1989). 
‘Ecology-for-debt’ means a condition for debt rescheduling (or relief) which 
seems inevitable, given the liquidity problems of the countries in transition. 
The fact that there are explicit conditions regarding the introduction of 
emission levels and monitoring, and the implementation of environmental 
law should give the countries in question the impetus to start urgent 
initiatives immediately.




























































































IV. Eastern Response and Internal Change
This chapter sets out the internal effects of Western policies, describing the 
difficulties and dangers involved and relating the political and economic 
situation to the initial assumptions.
What first comes to mind in all the ECE countries, but especially in 
Poland and Bulgaria, is that the transformation policies are causing 
significant political and social problems. Rising unemployment and 
pauperisation, sinking purchasing power parity, and the general feeling 
among politicians and populations that they are still excluded by the West, 
or that they are second class, create the possibility that domestic resentment 
against the international aid regime may begin to mount. Partly, this 
resentment can be attributed to the enormous leverage that the West has and 
that leaves little space to ECE politicians. Although opinion polls taken in 
1990 suggested that there was fairly wide-spread popular support for 
market-oriented reforms among the population, recent polls suggest that the 
situation is beginning to change,44 which could in turn threaten the reforms 
themselves.
There may be at least two sets of reasons for the growing uneasiness of 
ECE countries with Western policies:
1. The policies for internal change are not appropriate, since they are too 
radical and the change in external relations, i.e. the switch from exclusive 
to inclusive East-West relations, has been too slow and insufficient. What 
this means is that there has been too little trade liberalisation by the West, 
too little political integration, and that the neo-liberal shock-therapies have 
not worked. This reasoning is related to dependence assumptions and 
implies that there are clear, negative systemic outside influences that the 
ECE countries are not able to counteract.
2. The political learning process between the ECE elites and the populations 
is too slow; i.e. policies that were applied at an early stage in a radical way 
by ECE elites were not quickly communicated and explained from the top 
down. Firms did not adapt to the new market principles and reduced 
production; trade unions did not cooperate in favour of adjustment and 
political parties were too weak and thus unable to guarantee a stable 
political framework for reforms. This reasoning is more related to the 
integration assumptions and implies that there are difficulties in the political




























































































processes of reform that will be gradually overcome by common efforts 
between East and West.
1. The Polish Transformation 1989-1991
During the Round-Table negotiations between the trade union of 
Solidamosc, the OPZZ (the post-communist trade union) and the PZPR (the 
Polish United Workers’ Party) in spring 1989, the political will for a radical 
change in the direction of democracy and a market economy became clear. 
Remedying the sky-rocketing inflation (ca. 900% in 1989) as well as 
stopping the beginning production recession were internal priority goals. 
Only after those goals had been achieved, would further system change be 
feasible. As indicated above, this gradualist plan of transformation did 
however not survive the political developments of the second half of 1989.
After the electoral victory of Solidamosc in June/July 1989, the new 
government under Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, started drafting plans for far-reaching 
changes in the political and economic system, that is for a transformation 
from state-socialism to the reference system of highly developed Western 
countries. Balcerowicz’s programme relied heavily on external support. 
Both the stabilisation of the declining Polish economy and the system 
changes could only succeed on the basis of external factors which the IMF, 
the World Bank and the Western governments were expected to guarantee 
(Economic Programme, 1989, p.6).
A comparison of the “Economic Programme” with the “ Memorandum 
on the Economic Reform Programme in Poland and the Role of Foreign 
Financial Assistance” , a memorandum which Balcerowicz presented to the 
IMF in September 1989,45 reveals that the decision making process for 
transformation policies was established mainly between the new Polish 
political elites, the government and a variety of external, i.e. Western actors. 
The debate about how to stabilise the Polish economy was, to a large 
extent, carried on outside the country. Hundreds of Western advisors gave 
their opinions and the most dominant stream of ideas was created by 
external advisors to the government.
Since the elections in June 1989, three major plans for economic 
stabilisation and systemic change have been publicly discussed: the Soros 
Plan (developed by the American brain trust of the Hungarian bom 
American millionaire George Soros), the Sachs Plan (developed by the




























































































Harvard Professor of Economics, Jeffrey Sachs, also sponsored by Soros), 
and the Balcerowicz Plan, created together with the IMF and again advised 
by Jeffrey Sachs (Nuti, 1990).
In order to speed up the difficult internal discourse about the modality 
and schedule of adjustments to be made, Solidamosc leader Lech Walesa 
proposed to the first, half-freely elected, Sejm (the Polish Parliament) that 
it should surrender its legislative competences to the government. Giving 
the latter the right to issue decrees would speed up and facilitate the 
difficult discourse about transformation policies.46 This would strengthen 
the credibility in the eyes of the West, especially as regards the aid regime 
and foreign investment. Even if Walesa’s proposal was not accepted, it has 
remained a recurrent political topic until today, which suggests an inherent 
authoritarian trend that is especially dangerous in a difficult period of 
system transformation.
Since the government wanted to start the programme on January 1st, 
1990, the legislative chambers had to pass the government bills on major 
economic issues in a legislative marathon. During the course of internal 
debate, it was made clear by the IMF that there would be no approval of 
the government’s “Letter of Intent”47 before the legal basis for the macro- 
economic stabilisation and adjustment programme was created. At a later 
stage, in answering to a Polish request for an “extended arrangement” of 
US$2-2.4 billion, it was publicly announced that further help -  beyond an 
ordinary US$715m stand-by loan -  would be granted only if Poland kept 
to its economic policy obligations (Zycie Warszawy, 5.1.1990).
In spite of the general harmony of interests between the West and the 
Polish government in terms of a radical system change, there have been 
some specific conflicts about policies. Conflicts arose about:
-  The extent to which the external debt had to be serviced and what tools 
of debt reduction should be used. After all concessions that were made 
in 1989/90, Poland still payed back US$1,066m and US$430m yearly for 
capital repayment and interest service respectively from approx. US$9 
and 11 billion export revenues.
46 The politically discredited, post-communist five million members trade union OPZZ 
protested sharply against special legislative powers, saying that this meant introducing 
“ martial law” to the economy, restricting civil rights and eliminating all trade unions 
from public life. S. Zycie Warszawy, 14.12.1989, p. 1.




























































































-  The extent of cutting demand. The government proposed a wage 
indexation of 70% of inflation48 whereas the IMF demanded that there 
be only 30% in January, 20% in the following 3 months, and 60% in the 
rest of the year of 1990. The ongoing discussion about the ‘popiwek’ -  
the draconian anti-inflationary excessive wage tax for state-enterprises 
(only !) -  also showed the divergent interests at work. The government, 
pushed by interest groups, had to try to avoid recession by an excessive 
demand-barrier, while the IMF looked more at promoting exports and 
creating a stable, convertible Zloty (EIU, 3/1991, p. 8).
-  The extent of privatisation. Privatisation is possibly the hottest issue in 
the politics of reform since it involves a completely new distribution of 
power and wealth. The IMF had pressed for rapid privatisation policies 
in 1989/90 in a rather low profile, secret manner. Only in 1991 did the 
IMF introduce a conditionality on privatisation into the current 
adjustment programme, demanding privatisation of 50% of all state- 
enterprises within the following three years (EIU, 2/1991).
-  The extent of devaluation of the Zloty and the balance of trade and 
payments.
-  Cuts in subsidies and the size of the budget deficit.
By analysing the imposition of the Western aid regime’s values into the 
government policy, the extent of Poland’s dependence can be shown. Since 
1989, the Polish government has pushed a most rapid and courageous 
package of transformation policies through the decision making process. 
The Polish legislative institutions, Sejm and Senat, passed dozens of laws 
in the shortest possible time, thus making the transformation possible. The 
laws addressed the following points:49
-  The almost complete elimination of price controls.50 *
-  The unification of the manifold exchange rates together with the 
devaluation of the Zloty and the creation of a fixed exchange rate with 
the US Dollar.
48 Information from a discussion with Professor Tadeusz Kowalik, March 1990.
49 All points can be found in the “ Letter of Intent” , a document sent by the Polish 
government in December 1989 to the IMF. Henceforth “ LI, 1989” .
50 With the exception of rents, municipal services, coal (prices going up 400% for 
industrial and 500% for private users), and electricity (+300%). These prices have been




























































































-  The freezing of wages, the so-called ‘nominal wage policy’ (January 
30%, February to April 20%, from May 60% indexation; a reduction of 
about 20% in purchasing power was to be expected ex ante).
-  The obligation to attain state-budget equilibrium if not surplus (!), 
together with a new law that excludes the refinancing of budget deficits 
through cheap loans from the Central Bank.
-  A tight credit squeeze and the introduction of interest rates exceeding the 
rate of inflation as of January 1st, 1990.
-  The lifting of quantitative import and export restrictions by amending the 
foreign trade law.
-  The simplification of bankruptcy procedures.
-  The amending of labour legislation in order to facilitate “ adjustment in 
employment” .51
-  Selling off state-owned assets by way of public offers and auction.
The only policy area that did not get a legal framework before July 1990 
was the area of privatisation, since a compromise was only found with 
difficulty within the Polish political elite.52 However, despite internal 
discontent, the government has -  according to the aid regime -  launched a 
new privatisation initiative with the aim of rapid privatisation of the 400 top 
industrial concerns by the end of 1991. The ultimate goal was the 
privatisation of 50-80% of state firms within three years.53 In order to 
demonstrate its power, the IMF announced in September 1991, one month 
before the parliamentary elections, that it would suspend the payment of a 
credit tranche, since the pace of change seemed not to be satisfactory (Der 
Standard, 28/29.9.1991). It can be therefore argued that the IMF enforces 
certain policies and thereby interferes in the balance of power between 
various political interest groups within the dependent state.
This is especially important as it is the aid regime’s policy to restore the 
external performance of the ECE (esp. Poland and Bulgaria). In contrast,
51 A euphemism for the 400,000 unemployed that were expected within one year. In 
1991, a new mechanism was introduced, giving tax-benefits to those enterprises that fire 
work force (PCR, 3/1991).
52 Nevertheless, the “ Letter of Intent” promised “ to complete the legislative work and 
set up the organizational frame-work for a far-reaching transformation of the ownership 
of enterprises ...”  (LI, 1989, pp. 19-20).
53 The plan was based on the ‘voucher’ scheme. It envisages a prime role for Western 
investment managers steering the ca. 20 new unit trust funds which will be given the 
role of an entrepreneur. The plan was designed by merchant bankers, S G Warburg, and 
funded by the British government (EIU, 3/1991). The plan passed the parliament with 




























































































the political elite and socio-economic interest groups like trade unions, 
farmers’ representations, have tried to guarantee socio-economic 
development, i.e. to bargain for the very best external (lowest possible debt 
repayment and best possible trade-arrangement) and internal (cushioning of 
social, political and economic costs) conditioning of adjustment and 
transformation.
This conflict is also reflected in the different programmatical position on 
the transformation policies. Whereas the aid-regime adhered to a more neo­
liberal vision of transformation policies (shock-therapy), and was supported 
in this by some parts of the governmental elites, the majority of interest- 
groups and political parties supported a more socio-gradual view. -  best 
visible in the October 1991 parliamentary elections, where most winning 
parties in fact won because they refused the Balcerowicz programme and 
presented more socio-gradual alternatives.
However, in spite of the physical size of socio-gradually oriented 
political and technocratic interest groups, such groups have played a very 
weak role in negotiations over the demands of the international community 
(Stadler, 1993). Their argument was that in order to achieve debt repayment 
and a reasonably acceptable trade deficit, the priority needs to be 
accelerated internal economic growth rather than a recession. This would 
clearly imply other policies than those envisaged by the IMF and the 
Balcerowicz-team.54 above all anti-recessionary measures. Even if this 
rationale for economic transformation policy were more efficient in terms 
of socio-economic development and internal political cohesion and thus 
more successful in solving external problems, it would find little support 
from Western actors. The reason can be found in the negotiations between 
the international environment, the government and socio-economic interest 
groups, where the latter have the least influence. Socio-gradual groups have 
not only been politically discouraged by the dominance of neo-liberal 
thinking in the aid-regime, they have also been limiting themselves by 
anticipating the demands of the international environment. Additionally, the 
technocratic elite around the government used the pressure of the West 
frequently as a political argument in order to legitimise the Balcerowicz 
programme. The overwhelming power of the aid regime, a technocratic 
governmental elite with fragile links to its societal basis, a discredited
54 This was the argumentation more or less put forward by all political groups described 
as ‘socio-liberal'. See e.g. Laski. Karzimierz (Zycie Gospodarcze, 18.2.1990). who 
maintained that reducing investments and budget deficit would be enough to curtail 
inflation in Poland. Also Sadowski, Wladislaw, “ Suppressing hyperinflation rather than 
production ”, Zycie Gospodarcze, 25.2.1990. Egon Matzner (et al.) developped the socio- 




























































































opposition, the lack of nation-wide, homogenous, interest mediators, and a 
hasty decision making process were all factors that led to the application of 
a reform programme whose results after three years can be seen to be 
overwhelmingly negative.
Results of the IMF-Programme in Poland
(1) The social costs exceeded by far every necessity:55 the drop in 
purchase power was estimated for 1990 to be approx. 30% and for the 
first half of 1991 approx 15% (PCR, 3/1991, p. 13; see Table 3). 
Unemployment rose by the end of 1991 to more than 2 million (cf. 
also UN-ECE, 1992).
(2) Rather than running a negative trade balance and finally increasing 
imports for modernisation, Poland ran a unnecessarily high trade 
surplus in 1990 (see Table 2 and Nuti, 1991) and in 1992.
(3) Poland had to cope with the deepest production recession in its history, 
which endangered the stabilisation (Table 3, cf. UN-ECE, 1992).
It is not possible to attribute these clearly negative developments solely to 
the aid regime. Clearly, one can only guess what would have happened if 
its prescriptions had not affected policy making. Still, the critical record of 
three years post-communist East-West relations in the Polish case suggests 
to rethink the role of the West and its political institutions. East European 
governments depend on Western involvement in pursuing the goal of 
development, but this dependence has its negative aspects and costs.
2. The Bulgarian Transition and Specific Environmental Problems
What took a few weeks in other countries -  i.e. the elimination of the 
Communists from the government -  took nearly two years in Bulgaria. 
After the ousting of Todor Zivkov on 10 November 1989, political 
pluralism was introduced, resulting in a coalition government in December 
1990. Changes occurred rather slowly, with the (ex-)Communists acting as 
a brake. As late as October 1991 the second free elections left the majority 
in hands of the Union of Democratic Forces, backed up by external support 
from the (mainly Turkish) Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
55 D.M. Nuti at a World Bank seminar in Warsaw, 12.3.1990. His appraisal was that the 
stabilization programme is “ overshooted in terms of income reduction”  since there is 
a 36% reduction of real wages”  (in the meanwhile, real wages have further decreased). 
Nuti even talked about a “ underconsumption crisis”  and about the need for a “ trade 




























































































Since the UDF government became responsible for the creation of a new 
legal framework, the process of change has been speeded up. In fulfilment 
of one of the conditions set by the IMF and the WB a Credit and Banking 
Law passed through the Bulgarian parliament on 28 February 1992.
Internal Changes
As in Western countries, there were serious conflicts of interest between 
environmental goals and trade unions in Bulgaria. In March 1992. the 
biggest strike-wave since the establishment of a non-Communist 
government hit the country. Certain industries, especially of the highly 
polluting kind, had been designated to be closed (metallurgical and heavy 
industry). 20,000 of 50,000 miners under the lead of the trade union 
Podkrepa protested against low salaries and the danger of becoming 
unemployed (Le Monde, 30 March 1992). Environmentalists were simply 
seen as the ‘Evil One’ in a country where at the moment 70% of the 
population live below the poverty level (Deutsches Allgemeines 
Sonntagsblatt, 27 March 1992) and unemployment rates are likely to rise 
by up to 25% in 1992 (EIU 1991a. p. 34).
To shed some light on Bulgaria’s relation with Western governments and 
institutions, some examples are given in which the environment plays a key 
role.
Firstly, the REC in Budapest has so far approved a few projects which 
were submitted by non-governmental or academic organisations. The setting 
up of a water quality network called Infodanube, the making of 
documentary films on environmental topics and the elaboration of a strategy 
for the use of pesticides were all things that were carried out with financing 
of the REC. Other projects were rejected because of their exclusively 
scientific or commercial orientation. However, the wide range of projects 
and the fact that both domestic applicants and foreign evaluators were 
involved suggest that money is spent where it is really needed: for concrete 
and sustainable results. The decision was in each case a shared one, which 
shows that in these cases there is no asymmetrical dependence on the 
donor.
Secondly, as an example of bi-lateral (environmental) relations, the text 
of an “ agreement on collaboration in environmental protection” between 
Germany and Bulgaria seems to reproduce a mutual assessment of areas 
concerned. Nevertheless, the concrete provisions are rather scarce 
(Abkommen, 1989). However, further exchange of expertise between the 
specialists in charge will be a step in the right direction of producing made- 
to-measure solutions.
Unfortunately, Bulgarian reality has shown to be the opposite: as a result 




























































































expert units, the ‘Centre for Environmental Monitoring’, was recently 
closed down.
Bargaining Positions around the Kozloduj Nuclear Power Plant
As one fairly well documented example of environmental relations and the 
diverging bargaining positions the case of nuclear energy will be briefly 
described, focussing on the Kozloduj Nuclear Power Plant. The interests 
regarding the continuation and the closure of the plant are rather 
intertwined, and are not simply separated by the former iron curtain. That 
is, depending on the issue, strange coalitions surge, which impede an 
objective assessment of the case (see also Stein 1991). Indeed, these 
intersecting interests show how complicated the situation is.
1. In a national framework FOR a continuation of nuclear energy 
production:
-  Domestic substitute energy production (mostly lignite) would still worsen 
existing pollution.
-  40% of an already scarce energy supply cannot be replaced; considerable 
electricity cuts might cause social unrest.
-  Foreign substitute energy production (recently also from Eastern Europe) 
is available only with unavailable hard currency.
-  Even if newly discovered gas and oil fields in the Black Sea can be 
exploited, Bulgaria would rather sell them to the world market for hard 
currency (in order to assure debt repayment and to pay for indispensable 
imports).
-  Nuclear danger for all of Europe is the first valuable pawn Bulgaria ever 
had. As long as this danger exists, Bulgaria’s bargaining position is 
reinforced, and Western support more likely to follow.
2. In a national framework AGAINST a continuation of nuclear energy 
production:
-  Environmentalists absolutely reject nuclear energy.
-  Desperately poor security levels and high danger of accidents.
-  Russian experts who ran the plant left; domestic specialists change to 
better paid positions in private industry.
-  International standing jeopardised in the case of an accident.
-  Loss of funding through emergency spending and damage could 




























































































3. In an international framework AGAINST a continuation of nuclear 
energy production:
-  Western environmentalists fear improvements could serve as a new 
legitimation of nuclear energy in general.
-  Neighbouring countries pressure safety of their populations (but often do 
not consider their own nuclear plants).
-  Western nuclear lobby (e.g. the IAEA) fears a second “greatest 
conceivable accident” , which would rule out any further public 
acceptance of nuclear energy in Europe.
4. In an international framework FOR a continuation of nuclear energy 
production (on the condition that improvements are made):
-  Western nuclear industry, which hopes for a new market (with Western 
markets declining).
-  Interest by Siemens in the modification work (and consequently in the 
aid payed by the EC which amounted to limn ecus in 1991).
-  Germany offered to sell parts of the shut-down Greifenwald reactor in 
East Germany for the modification of Kozloduj.
Any harmonisation of these diverging goals and interests seems unlikely in 
the near future. On a national level, a similar weighing of disparate interests 
can be found in most areas where environmental protection is at stake. As 
to East-West relations, the conflict of goals in the case of the nuclear debate 
is more pressing, since the West is more directly involved. However, the 
effects on East-West relations might be temporarily and more open to 
variation since the nuclear danger influences the West in a more direct way.
As a conclusion, several conditions can be formulated that have to be 
met in order to improve environmental protection in Bulgaria (see also 
Stanchev, 1992):
-  state institutions have to be persuaded to adapt environmental laws and 
standards to West European level;
-  international institutions should include the environmental issue in their 
economic and financial reconstruction programmes;
-  appropriate technology has to be transferred for environmental 
improvements;
-  Eastern Europe has to be included in a Pan-European environmental 




























































































-  environmental NGOs, education and training programmes have to be 
supported.
Given that Bulgaria is not in a position to establish these goals on her own 
and that it is totally dependent on the foreign aid programmes, that do not 
regard the environmental problem as a priority, there seems to be little hope 
that any effective environmental reconstruction will be undertaken in this 
country in the near future.
V. Conclusion and Some Ideas for Policy Implications
The political, economic and ecological transformation of ECE has proved 
more difficult and complex than either the West or the new democratic 
elites expected. The West has a huge shaping power in the transition of the 
ECE countries, which find themselves in a new relationship somewhere 
between the two extremes which we initially conceptualised in terms of 
integration and dependence. Even if we cannot conclusively summarise 
(further research is needed) the theoretical frame-work of ‘integration’, 
‘dependence’ and the theoretical umbrella of ‘ecology’, we have shed some 
light on the new state of East-West relations:
1. The Western aid regime provides considerable financial, technical, legal 
and political support for economic reconstruction and the integration of 
ECE. However, the relative neglect of social and ecological factors and the 
deep recessions hint at growing rather than diminishing dependence.
2. Despite some development of common inclusive political structures the 
major questions of economic policy in East-West relations are still handled 
through structures where the West can easily have a dominating role and 
the ECE countries are deemed to be policy takers. A similar situation 
prevails in the security sector, where there may have been some progress 
towards integrating ECE into security structures, but where NATO still 
remains a Western club.
3. Common visions and values were developed very quickly in broad 
general terms, as regards the establishment of democracy and a market 
economy; less quickly in questions of environmental awareness; in specific 
policy areas, however (EBRD’s lending to private sector, neo-liberalism 




























































































4. The end of the Cold war has multiplied transnational non-governmental 
links. However, governmental links between East and West still play a 
major role (due amongst other things to the wide Western governmental 
involvement in restructuring Eastern Europe) and there is still no free 
exchange for ECE, particularly in the labour sector.
The following conclusions can be formulated with respect to (a) 
domestic, (b) foreign, and (c) environmental policies.
(a) Socio-political stability and cohesion is very low in ECE countries, but 
these are exactly the qualities that are necessary in a situation of difficult 
adjustment and transformation. The legitimacy of the new political elites is 
not firmly established but conditional on an improvement in the socio­
economic situation. Radical transformation policies enforced by the aid 
regime may further aggravate the social and economic crisis -  because of 
the inadequacy of the policies themselves, because of political opposition 
to those programmes and because of the high social costs. Western support 
should therefore take more account of domestic political and programmatic 
forces.
(b) External policies should focus more on ECE-regional integration. 
Similarly, and in view of the fact that the majority of ECE countries have 
similar external problems, they could formulate common policies to increase 
their power in the aid regime negotiations. The main demand should be 
stronger non-reciprocity in trade liberalisation for a longer period than 
envisaged by the Europe Agreements. East European countries could 
legitimately reduce their debt servicing if market-access is not granted. 
Other possibilities of facilitating transformation and adjustment are debtor- 
cartels and the creation of a new East and Central European payments, 
customs and security union56 as a step towards integration into the 
European Community (proposed also by Walesa in 1992 under the heading 
“ NATO-B1S and EC-BIS”).
(c) As far as the environment is concerned, duplicating the Western 
environmental policy will bring a lot of short-term improvements for 
Eastern countries. But it will mean duplicating Western environmental 
problems too; and despite some successes of advanced environmental 
technology and policy, the West is far from being an environmental
56 These questions were intensively discussed at a Conference at the EUI in January 




























































































paradise. The interest of Western Europe in the East can partly be explained 
by reference to a sort of transnational NIMBYism (Not-in-my-backyard). 
Both a specially designed approach for Eastern environmental problems and 
a generally more cooperative procedure would be a really first-best choice 
for the future. A specially designed institution, similar to the institutions 
which have been planned as a follow up to the decisions of the UNCED 
conference in Rio, with the task of coordinating environmental programmes, 
would help to harmonise efforts and facilitate the exchange of know-how. 
The EBRD could take a stronger role, reinforcing its environmental unit, 
and/or shifting its emphasis from being an investment bank to ‘development 
and environment’ tasks. The instrument of debt-for-ecology-swaps discussed 
above should be seriously taken into consideration as a way of increasing 
awareness of the environmental crisis and stimulating cleanup and 
reconstruction measures.
The aspects of dependence discussed in this paper can only be converted 
into interdependence and integration by strengthening and creating larger 
European political structures where conflict and cooperation can be handled 
in a fairer and more democratic way. ECE countries, though being still 
essentially policy-takers, would find it easier to present their problems and 
have at least some influence on the policies they adopt. Institutionalised and 
binding political structures could also improve the policy and information 
process between donors and recipients in restructuring ECE.
EC and EFTA countries should live up to their own rhetoric about 
European integration with more and more balanced and tailor-made support. 
It should be possible to think of (1) a clear timetable for political and 
economic (with intermediary protective measures) integration based on (2) 
conditionalities that look not only at economics, but also at democratic (e.g. 
minorities), social (esp. unemployment) and ecological criteria. This could 
also enhance the links between social, political and environmental groups 
in the East and West, thereby strengthening the integration -  and weakening 





























































































Table 1 Gross Debt and Net Material Product (NMP) Change in Poland 1987-1992
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Debt (US$m) 39.2 38.9 46.6 49.0 49.5
Real NMP (%) 4.9 -0.2 -15.8 -10.0 -0.5
Source: EIU 1991/2.
Table 2 Debt, Current Account, Recession, Aid Regime’s Activities in Poland. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania in 1990
Poland CSFR Hungary Bulgaria Romania
US$bn
Gross External Debt 46.6 7.6 20.6 11.0 1.3




-15.8 -3.5 -1.5 -11.0 -10.2
Aid Regime’s 
Position
dominating consulting dominating dominating dominating
Sources: EIU (1991-93)
Table 3 Results of Economic Reform Programme in Poland since the Reform Start 
in 1990 (Real changes in per cent compared to preceding year)
1990 1991 1992
Industrial Production -24 -12 2
Inflation 586 70.3 43
Real Average Income -30 -5 -2
Unemployment 6.1 12.2 15
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